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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellees Scot and Brenda Roberts ("Roberts") do not contest the 
jurisdiction of this Court, and submit that jurisdiction is proper in this Court for the reasons 
set forth in the Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant/Appellant A.J. Dean ("A.J. Dean") lists nine issues on appeal. For 
puiposes of the discussion herein, these issues are addressed in the context of the following 
three issues: 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion in entering the default of A.J. Dean 
based on a failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. This issue 
incorporates issues A through D set forth in A.J. Dean's Brief (including both 
issues labeled "C"). 
II. Did the district court have an adequate factual basis upon which to base its 
award of damages and punitive damages in the Default Judgment entered 
against A.J. Dean. This issue incorporates issues E through G set forth in A.J. 
Dean's Brief 
III. Was the district court required to vacate the Default Judgment because 
Roberts' counsel had an unknown conflict of interest arising after the entry of 
default. This issue corresponds with A.J. Dean's issue H. 
GOVERNING LAW 
Provisions of statutes and mles which are of central importance to this appeal are set 
out verbatim in the portion of the argument to which they apply. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History. 
This case arises out of the defective replacement of a driveway at the Roberts' home 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Roberts' Complaint was filed on March 29, 1993, alleging 
multiple claims against A.J. Dean arising from its misconduct in supplying materials to that 
project, its recording and of a forged Notice of Lien, and its improper conduct in threatening 
to enforce the Lien. A.J. Dean filed its Answer on April 29, 1993. 
In March of 1994, the parties were before the district court on the Roberts' Motion 
to Compel discoveiy. The district court ordered A.J. Dean to answer specific discovery 
requests by April 5, 1994 and ordered that if A.J. Dean failed to respond to discoveiy, the 
court would enter default on the ex parte motion of the Roberts. A.J. Dean failed to respond 
to the discoveiy, and on April 18, 1994, the Roberts ultimately requested entry of default 
pursuant to the Order. 
After a hearing at which A.J. Dean was allowed to participate in full, the district court 
granted the Roberts' Motion and directed Roberts' counsel to prepare findings. A.J. Dean 
objected to the findings and the district court held another hearing, after which it executed 
the findings, and entered default. A.J. Dean then filed a Motion to Set Aside, which the 
district court denied after a hearing. The district court then set the matter for a hearing at 
which to establish the amount of damages. The Roberts appeared and presented by sworn 
proffer substantial evidence as to the factual basis of its claims and the basis for damages. 
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The district court thus fixed damages, and entered its Default Judgment against A.J. Dean, 
which was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54 (b). A J. Dean appealed the Judgment to this 
Court. 
B. Facts Relevant to the Appeal. 
For purposes of this appeal, the Roberts submit the following statement of relevant 
facts. 
1. Facts Underlying the Roberts' Claims. 
A.J. Dean provided materials in connection with installing the Roberts' driveway in 
January of 1993. (R2386, at 99.) A.J. Dean provided cement in inappropriate weather 
conditions, causing the diiveway to crack. (R2342-45.) A.J. Dean also drove its trucks over 
the Roberts' lawn and into the house, causing substantial damage. (R2342-44.) 
When the Roberts refused to pay a portion of the bill for the driveway, A.J. Dean 
recorded a Notice of Lien. (R2342-46.) A.J. Dean's general manager, Robert Bagley, then 
telephoned Brenda Roberts and threatened that her home would be sold immediately if she 
did not pay in full. (R2386, at 99-102.) Thereafter, the Roberts engaged attorney Jaryl 
Rencher to assist them and to prepare the Complaint in this action. (R2342, at 102.) 
In the course of litigation, the Roberts discovered that the signature on the Notice of 
Lien filed by A.J. Dean was in fact forged. (R2386, at 209.) Rencher thus requested, on 
more than one occasion, that A.J. Dean release the forged lien, but A.J. Dean refused. 
(R2342-45.) As a result of the lien, the Roberts were further damages in that they were 
unable to obtain refinancing on their home. (R2342-48.) 
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2. The Order Compelling Discovery, 
On August 18, 1993, Scot and Brenda Roberts ("Roberts") served their First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on A.J. Dean. (R204.) Due to 
a clerical error, some of the interrogatories made reference to claims for medical malpractice. 
Counsel for A.J. Dean, Randall Marshall, brought this fact to Rencher's attention, and 
Rencher instructed counsel to disregard inapplicable interrogatories or substitute appropriate 
references to the propeity and case at issue. Rencher sent Marshall a letter to that effect on 
November 22, 1994, and A. J. Dean made no further objection to the irrelevant interrogatories 
until filing its Brief in this appeal. 
On January 3, 1994, Roberts Served a Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents on A.J. Dean, (R374.) A.J. Dean responded to that discovery in 
part by asserting various objections. On January 19, 1994, Roberts filed a Motion to Compel 
and for Sanctions based on A.J. Dean's failure to respond to the first set of discoveiy 
requests and its objections to the second set. (R381.) 
On March 21, 1994, the trial court heard argument on Roberts' Motion to Compel and 
for Sanctions, and granted the Motion.1 (R560.) Specifically, the trial court ordered that A.J. 
Dean provide answers to specific discoveiy requests by April 5, 1994. (R640.) The trial 
court further ruled that if Dean did not comply by April 5,1994, Roberts could submit ex 
parte an affidavit and motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings, and the trial court would enter 
A. J. Dean's default. (R640, 641.) Both A J. Dean's counsel, Randall Marshall, and its 
*A. J. Dean has not argued that the court erred in granting the Motion to Compel, and this 
Court may thus consider that the Motion was properly granted based on A.J. Dean's failure to 
comply with the applicable provisions of Part V of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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general manager, Robert Bagley, were present at the hearing and heard the ruling. 
(Transcript of Proceedings at 2379, Appellant's Brief, Addendum B.) 
The Roberts' prepared an Order reflecting the ruling, which it served on Randall 
Marshall as counsel for A.J. Dean. The Order was delivered to the trial court for signature 
on approximately March 31,1994. (R634.) At approximately the same time, Rencher 
received from Julie Lund of the law firm of Green & Beny a Substitution of Counsel by 
which Green & Beny purported to replace Randall Marshall as counsel. (R575.) While 
Marshall did not sign the Substitution, he did file a notice of withdrawal of counsel on April 
5, 1994. (R593.) Roberts responded to the Substitution with an objection to the withdrawal 
of counsel on the basis that there were pending motions which had not been resolved. 
(R591.) 
On April 6, 1994, the trial court held a telephone conference to consider one of the 
pending motions not related to the issues on appeal herein. (R1685, 1690). During the 
course of that telephone hearing, the district court informed Randall Marshall that it would 
not permit his withdrawal without leave of court, and that his request to withdraw was denied 
at that time. (R1685, 1690). On April 11, 1994, Roberts filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to the request of A.J. Dean's counsel, Randall Marshall, to withdraw. (R652.) 
On April 11, 1994, Scott Berry of Green & Berry filed an Appearance of Co-counsel, 
reflecting delivery to all counsel of record on the case, including Randall Marshall. (R646.) 
On April 12 and April 13, 1994, Roberts' counsel contacted Julie Lund at Green & Beny and 
again requested that the answers to discovery be provided immediately. (R1689, Para. 12.) 
Roberts counsel also faxed Ms. Lund a copy of the April 7, 1994 Order. (R1689, Para. 12.) 
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On April 18, 1994, after having not received A.J. Dean's responses to discoveiy, 
Roberts filed a motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and enter default. (R688.) On the 
same day, A.J. Dean attempted to comply with the Order by filing responses to the 
discoveiy, but those responses were deemed inadequate by the trial court. (R. 1567). This 
Motion was heard on June 27, 1994, with Randall Marshall, Scott Berry and Julie Lund all 
present on behalf of A.J. Dean. (R1212.) After hearing argument, the trial court ruled in 
favor of Roberts, and instructed Rencher to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Findings"). (R1212.) Thereafter, A.J. Dean filed an objection to the proposed Findings, 
and the district court set the matter for hearing. (R1268.) After taking the matter under 
advisement (RMS 1), the trial court executed the Findings on December 5, 1994, and entered 
a Default Judgment against Dean on the issue of liability, resemng only the issues of 
damages for further hearing. (R1685.) 
On January 19, 1995, A.J. Dean Filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set aside Entry of 
Default. (R1722.) At approximately the same time, it was discovered that Rencher's law 
firm had commenced representing A.J. Dean as counsel for A.J. Dean's insurance carrier in 
defense litigation in approximately July of 1994. (See record entries at R1891, R1899, 
Transcript Proceedings August 13, 1996, R2386, p. 140). As a result, Roberts' counsel, Jaryl 
Rencher, voluntarily withdrew on March 24, 1995. (R1923.) Woodbury & Kesler then 
entered its appearance as Roberts' counsel and filed Roberts Memorandum opposing the 
Motion to Set Aside on October 5, 1995. (R1936.) After a hearing, A.J. Dean's Motion to 
Set Aside Default was denied. (Transcript of Proceedings January 12, 1996, R283; Order 
R1969). 
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The court then set a hearing to review the prima facie claims of the Roberts, to fix 
damages, and to consider the Roberts' request for punitive damages. (R2386.) Roberts 
presented prima facie evidence of their claims through a proffer of counsel, which was 
affirmed under oath by the Roberts, who were present. Roberts also put on testimony of an 
expert witness, Brent Thomas, as to damages, and the testimony of Scot Roberts, Brenda 
Roberts, and Jaryl Rencher relative to punitive damages. A.J. Dean conducted cross-
examination of all witnesses as to the issue of damages. (See generally. R2386 (transcript)). 
Default judgment was entered in favor of Roberts against A.J. Dean on December 20, 1996. 
The trial court fixed damages in the amount of $28,978.01, and punitive damages in the 
amount of $5,000.00. (R2351.) A.J. Dean's Notice of Appeal was filed January 6, 1997. 
(R2353.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Roberts argues herein that the Default Judgment was appropriate in all respects, and 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages and punitive damages 
thereon. First, the Roberts argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
the sanction of default on A.J. Dean for failure to comply with a valid order compelling 
discoveiy. The excuses offered by A.J. Dean in an attempt to justify its failure to comply 
are without merit because A.J. Dean had appropriate notice of the Order compelling 
discoveiy, and willfully failed to comply. 
Second, the Roberts argue that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting a 
hearing pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) to fix the amount of damages. The trial court 
heard proffers regarding liability on the Roberts theories of relief, and heard live testimony 
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of witnesses as to damages and punitive damages, subject to the cross-examination of A.J. 
Dean. The trial court's award of damages was thus supported by substantial credible 
evidence, and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Finally, the Roberts argue that the conflict of interest which required the withdrawal 
of thel'r prior counsel, Jaryl Rencher, did not taint the judgment in any material way and is 
not pioper grounds upon which to vacate the judgment of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ENTERING THE DEFAULT OF A.J. DEAN BASED ON A 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER COMPELLING 
DISCOVERY? 
A. Discovery Sanctions are Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion, 
At the heart of its appeal, A.J. Dean requests this Court to reverse a sanction imposed 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 (b) for failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. 
Under Utah law, however, the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court described the standard of review in 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 1997), as follows: 
Even though dismissal of a non-complying party's action is one of the 
"most severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed," it is clear 
from the language of rule 37 that it is within a trial court's discretion 
to impose such a sanction. "Because trial courts must deal first hand 
with the parties and the discovery process, they are given broad 
discretion regarding the imposition of discoveiy sanctions." Thus we 
have long held that we will not interfere unless "abuse of that discretion 
[is] clearly shown." 
* * * 
We will find that a trial court has abused its discretion in choosing 
-8-
which sanction to impose only if there is either "an erroneous 
conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiaiy basis for the trial court's 
ruling." 
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). See also Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 
4 (Utah 1995) (Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion 
unless abuse of that discretion is clearly shown.); Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) 
(That some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion that the 
court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances support the 
refusal.) 
In short, the law imposes on A.J. Dean in this appeal a burden of demonstrating a 
clear abuse of discretion. To succeed, A J. Dean must demonstrate that there is no 
evidentiary basis in the record for the tidal courts findings. A.J. Dean has made no effort to 
marshal the evidence and demonstrate the absence of such a basis, and the appeal therefore 
must fail. 
B. The Default Judgment was not an Abuse of Discretion. 
Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discoveiy .. . the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
# # # 
(C) an order striking out pleadings . . . or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently considered the sanction of default for failure to comply 
with an order compelling discoveiy in Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271 
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(Utah 1997). In that case, Morton obtained a continuance of trial to allow him to present a 
new theory at trial. ML at 275. He then failed to respond to discovery requests addressed to 
that new theoiy. Id Morton admitted that he received the Defendant's Motion to Compel, 
which specifically requested the sanction of dismissal if he did not comply with discoveiy. 
Neveitlieless, Morton's counsel did not respond, and the court ultimately dismissed Morton's 
Complaint. Id The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sanction of dismissal should 
only be applied in the cases involving more egregious neglect and misconduct. TdL at 273-74. 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial 
court's imposition of the sanction of dismissal. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that in 
order to impose sanctions under Rule 37 (b), the trial court need only find that the non-
complying party's conduct amounted to "willfulness, bad faith, or fault," or "persistent 
dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Id at 274, 276. The Supreme Court defined 
this standard of conduct as follows: 
To find that a party's behavior has been willful, there need only 
be '"any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary 
noncompliance.'" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., (quoting, M.E.N. Co. v. 
Control Fluidics. Inc.. 834 F.2d 869, 872-73 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
938 P.2d at 276. The Supreme Court concluded that because Morton was aware of the 
Motion to Compel and still failed to respond to the discoveiy, his conduct was "at least 
willful." Id at 276. Citing instances in which the sanction of dismissal or default judgment 
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was affirmed from relatively non-egregious conduct,2 the Supreme Court ruled that the trial 
court was within its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal. JdL at 276-77. See also 
U.D.O.T. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4 (1995) (holding that the sanction of default judgment 
is appropriate upon a showing of willfulness or fault, and that no wrongful intent need be 
shown). 
In this case, A.J. Dean's general manager and counsel were both present in the 
courtroom when the trial judge ordered that A.J. Dean comply with discovery or suffer the 
sanction of default judgment, without further opportunity to be heard. Rather than 
responding to the discoveiy, however, A.J. Dean apparently fried to fire its counsel, Randall 
Marshall. At tlie time both Marshall and A.J. Dean knew that die court had reached the limit 
2The Supreme Court's discussion in Morton of the prior cases casts substantial light on the 
facts at issue in this appeal, and is therefore worth quoting at length: 
[W]e have affirmed a trial court's dismissal as a sanction for behavior 
clearly less egregious than that apparently required by the court of appeals. 
See, e.g., W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 568 P.2d at 736-38 (affirming default 
judgment entered against defendant because defendant's answer to 
plaintiffs interrogatories and requests for production of documents were 
late, even though they were filed before hearing on summary judgment 
motion); Tucker Realty, 396 P.2d at 412, 16 Utah 2d at 99-101 (affirming 
default judgment where plaintiff responded to court order to compel 
production of documents by only producing one of many required 
documents); accord Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 
586-87 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming default judgment where plaintiffs 
failed to timely respond to interrogatories after court granted several 
continuances on plaintiffs' behalf, and plaintiffs had been "somewhat 
uneven in discharging their burden of prosecuting the case in a timely 
fashion"). In any event, all of these cases clearly stand for the proposition 
that trial courts are granted a great deal of deference in dismissing a case as 
a discovery sanction. 
938P.2dat276. 
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of its patience and that if A.J. Dean did not respond, default judgment would be entered 
immediately. The failure to respond to discovery was clearly willful within the meaning 
clarified by the Supreme Court in Morton. As such, the trial court had broad discretion to 
impose the sanction of dismissal, and its decision to do so should not be reversed.3 
C. A,J. Dean's Excuses for Failure to Comply with the Order 
Compelling Discovery are without Merit. 
On at least three occasions,4 A.J. Dean presented to the trial court several excuses for 
its failure to comply with the Order compelling discovery. Five of those excuses are offered 
for consideration on appeal. (See Brief of A.J. Dean, Issues A through D). 
1. Service of Defective Tnterrogatories. 
The fact that A.J. Dean's first set of discovery requests included references to claims 
for medical malpractice was never an issue in the trial court and is a red herring in this 
appeal. That issue was fully resolved by counsel's letter of November 22, 1993, and was 
never again brought to issue in the trial court. To the extent that any "confusion" did arise 
from the interrogatories, that conilision was unmistakably resolved on March 21, 1994, when 
the trial court ordered A.J. Dean to answer specific interrogatories and requests. 
3The fact that the Order compelling discovery in this case clearly identified "default" as the 
sanction that would be imposed if A.J. Dean did not comply with the Order provided fair warning 
to A.J. Dean of the seriousness of the situation, and was surely intended to motivate A.J. Dean to 
comply. The Roberts submit that if the trial court's discretion to actually impose the remedy of 
default is restrained in these circumstances, trial courts would lose the ability to control the 
conduct of recalcitrant litigants in this manner. That result would clearly be contrary to the intent 
expressed in Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
4The three occasions wt e the hearing on the Roberts' Motion for entry of default, the 
hearing on A.J. Dean's objections to the proposed Findings, and the hearing on A.J. Dean's 
Motion to set aside the default. 
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In its Brief, A J. Dean attempts to direct the inquiry back to the Order compelling 
discovery, arguing that the trial court did not consider the "confusion" caused by the medical 
malpractice interrogatories in issuing the Order to Compel. A.J. Dean's assertion, however, 
finds no basis in the record, particularly in light of the fact that the Order was made over A.J. 
Dean's objection and Motion for Protective Order, which was based primarily on the alleged 
"confusion." The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean cannot excuse its own failure to comply 
with the Order by reviving the same unsuccessful argument it advanced in attempting to 
resist entry of the Order. A.J. Dean offers no reason to conclude that the Order was an abuse 
of discretion. Therefore, the inquiry in this appeal should be limited to A.J. Dean's excuses 
for not complying with the Order, rather than the substance of the Order itself.5 
2. Service of Order, 
A.J. Dean's second excuse is that Roberts failed to serve the Order implementing the 
Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel on Green & Beny. In short, A.J. Dean argues that 
because of the Substitution of Counsel filed March 29, 1994, the proposed Order should have 
been served on Green & Beny. 
5Without citing authority, A.J. Dean's brief puts forth the novel theory that an 
Order to Compel under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 should be subject to the same 30 day time 
period set forth in Rule 33 (a). While it is true that a party has 30 days to answer 
interrogatories in the first instance, once a party has missed this deadline it is no longer 
entitled to this amount of time. In Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 955 
(Utah App. 1989), the Appeals Court upheld the trial court's entry of default on the 
grounds that no justifiable excuse was offered for failure to comply with the court's 
discoveiy order which allowed only two weeks—the same time period as that allowed in 
the case now at issue. 
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That argument was rejected in the trial court for three reasons, each of which is 
equally persuasive here. First, regardless of the Order, A. J. Dean had actual notice of the 
Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel and was obligated to comply. Robert Bagley, A.J. 
Dean's general manager, was in fact present in the courtroom when the ruling was 
announced. Even assuming that A.J. Dean's decision to change counsel right at this critical 
time period was properly motivated, it was A. J. Dean's responsibility to apprize its new 
counsel of the pending deadline, of which it was keenly aware. 
Second, service on Randall Marshall was proper. Immediately upon receipt of the 
Substitution of Counsel, Roberts objected to Marshall's withdrawal as counsel. Moreover, 
the trial court informed Mr. Marshall that it would not approve his withdrawal at that time 
because there were motions pending. At that point, Marshall had a duty to continue 
representing his client, and service on Marshall was deemed service on A.J. Dean under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 5. 
Finally, Green & Berry had notice of the deadline by at least April 11, 1994, and 
failed to take any action until April 18, 1994. It is important to note that Roberts did not 
dash into court ex parte, as authorized by the Order, and obtain a judgment on the first day 
after the deadline. Instead, Roberts waited a full week, discussed the Order with Julie Lund, 
waited almost another full week, and finally made a motion for entry of judgment. By that 
point, A.J. Dean and its various lawyers had received substantially more notice than that to 
which they were entitled under the Order. Simply put, the fact that the Order was not 
delivered to Green & Berry does not change the fact that A.J. Dean's failure to comply with 
the Order was willful and the result of fault attributable directly to the party and its counsel. 
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In summary, the trial court's Findings provided that A.J. Dean had been dilatory in 
responding to discovery, that A.J. Dean had adequate notice of the April 5, 1994 deadline 
for answering discoveiy, that A.J. Dean failed to comply with the April 5, 1994 deadline, and 
that A.J. Dean's "proposed answers" to discoveiy delivered April 18, 1994 were not 
adequate. (R1685-1721.) Nothing in A.J. Dean's discussion of the adequacy of notice 
provides any basis for challenging those Findings. 
3. Rule 4-506 and Substitution of Counsel. 
In the trial court, A.J. Dean argued that Green & Berry should have been substituted 
as counsel effective March 30, 1994, and thus should have been served with the Order. With 
regard to that argument, the trial court found as follows: 
14[ Nowhere in this Court's rules were Roberts required to 
serve pleadings upon attorneys that had attempted a substitution of 
counsel without the order of this Court required by Rule 4-506(1) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Further, if one of A.J. 
Dean's attorneys thought that another should be further involved in 
communications with the Court, that attorney had eveiy opportunity to 
raise this point and chose not to do so. Nowhere in any of the 
documents on file with this Court has A.J. Dean's attorney, Mr. 
Marshall, claimed by sworn affidavit or otherwise that (1) he did not 
receive, as A.J. Dean's counsel, all material matters that were filed in 
this case, (2) he did not appear on March 21, 1994, as counsel for A.J. 
Dean when the Court ordered A.J. Dean to comply with discoveiy 
responsibilities by April 5, 1994, and (3) he did not participate in the 
telephone conversation with the Court on April 6, 1994. To the 
contrary, the record reflects the fact that A.J. Dean appeared through 
counsel and was properly served with all filings in this case. 
(R1685, 1695.) 
In a further development of the same argument, A.J. Dean now argues that Rule 4-506 
has been amended effective November 1, 1997 to provide that no court approval is required 
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for a Substitution of Counsel if no requests for extension of time are made. Although A.J. 
Dean cites some cases appearing to favor the retroactive application of procedural 
amendments, this argument ultimate fails for three reasons. 
First, the argument fails to acknowledge that the issue is not whether Mr. Berry or Mr. 
Marshall was really the lawyer in charge, but whether A.J. Dean had proper notice of the 
Order. Since A.J. Dean's lawyer and its general manager both heard the trial court's ruling 
establishing the April 5, 1994 deadline, there can be no dispute that notice was adequate. 
Second, the text of the Rule itself provides that the amendment is "effective 
November 1, 1997." Because the rale itself expressly provides for an effective date, it 
cannot be said that the amendment should have been effective three and a half years earlier 
when Randall Marshall was trying to withdraw as counsel. 
And third, even under the cases cited by A.J. Dean, the newly amended Rule 4-506 
would not be retroactively applied in this case after final judgment. In Pilcher v. State Dept 
of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court held that procedural 
statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate, or 
destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and 
pending actions as well, hi this case, A.J. Dean attempts to apply the rule not in an accrued 
and pending case, but in a case that is finished and over, final judgment having been entered. 
Nothing in Pilcher or the cases cited in A.J. Dean's Brief supports the proposition that when 
procedural rales are amended, courts must roll back each case on their docket to the 
beginning and start over under the new rales. 
Moreover, retroactive application of the new rule in this case would be forbidden 
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under the mle set forth in Pilcher. because the Roberts' judgment constitutes a vested right 
as a matter of law. Black's Law Dictionaiy defines "vested rights" as follows: 
In constitutional law, rights which have so completely and 
definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to 
be defeated or canceled by the act of any other private person, and 
which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize 
and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the 
then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be 
deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly 
be deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure 
and for the public welfare. Such interests as cannot be interfered with 
by retrospective laws; interests which it is proper for state to recognize 
and protect and of which individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily 
without injustice. 
Blacks Law Dictionaiy 1402 (6th Ed. 1979). Both Pilcher and the cases cited by A.J. Dean 
support the proposition that no enactment can be applied retroactively to affect ones vested 
rights. Certainly, Utah law does not provide that every time there is an amendment to the 
rules of procedure, persons holding final judgments are required to re-litigate all affected 
procedural issues in the case. 
In summary, regardless of how Rule 4-506 has been amended since the time of 
Randall Marshall's abortive withdrawal, the fact remains that A.J. Dean received proper 
notice that if it did not respond to discoveiy before April 5, 1994, it would be defaulted and 
judgment would be entered. Final judgment having now been entered, the vested rights of 
the parties are not changed by an amended Rule 4-506 with an effective date of November 
1, 1997. 
4. Timing of the Order, 
In its Brief, A.J. Dean suggests that the Order was improper because it was not 
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entered until after the April 5, 1994 deadline had already passed. The trial court provided 
an appropriate response to that argument in its Order denying A.J. Dean's motions for 
additional time to complete discovery and for relief from the April 7, 1994 Order: 
With regard to the comment that the Court's order was signed 
April 7 inchoating an April 5 deadline, the parties were fully aware of 
when the deadline was. The order was presented to the Court and the 
Court waited five days plus three days mailing before entering that 
order to make sure there was no objection to that order. No objection 
was made. 
(R1424, 1427.) 
A.J. Dean's Brief offers no legal or factual reason why the Court's entry of the Order 
on April 7, 1994 would nullify the Order in total. Roberts submits that the Order was 
properly executed pursuant to Rule 4-504, and was immediately effective upon entry. 
5. The Roberts5 Delay in Obtaining New Counsel, 
A.J. Dean's Brief did not provide a substantive discussion of its issue D set forth in 
the Statement of Issues. The Roberts assume that this issue has been abandoned for purposes 
of this appeal, and do not discuss the issue herein. 
In summary, the trial court ordered A.J. Dean to respond to discoveiy, and clearly 
informed A.J. Dean that failure to do so would result in the entry of default. When A.J. 
Dean knowingly and willfully failed to comply, the trial court was within its discretion in 
ordering that default be entered. A.J. Dean's excuses for its failure to comply are without 
merit and do not in any way justify A.J. Dean's failure to comply with a clearly stated order 
of the trial court. 
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II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE AN ADEQUATE 
FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS AWARD OF 
DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST A.J. DEAN. 
Upon entry of judgment as to liability, the Court set the matter for a hearing on the 
issue of damages. The Court ordered that although A.J. Dean was in default and technically 
not entitled to participate at all, it would allow A.J. Dean to be present and participate in 
some respects. 
At the Court's invitation, Roberts established prima facie evidence of six of its claims 
for relief against A.J. Dean by a proffer of evidence which was affirmed by the Roberts who 
were present in the courtroom. The Roberts further established that they were entitled to 
damages in liquidated amounts on each of their claims. The Roberts did not make any claim 
for general damages, and no such damages were awarded. The Roberts did request punitive 
damages, and after taking the matter under advisement, a Judgment was entered awarding 
the liquidated damages in the total amount of $28,978.01 as established at the hearing, plus 
punitive damages in the amount of $5,000.00. The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean's 
challenges to both awards are without merit. 
A, The Award of Damages was Justified by Competent Evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2) describes the method of ascertaining damages where a party 
is in default as follows: 
In all other cases, the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter 
judgment or to cany it into effect, it is necessaiy to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
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the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessaiy and proper. 
Under this rule, it is incumbent upon the non-defaulting party to establish by competent 
evidence the amount of recoverable damages. Arnica Mut. Tns. Co. v. Schettler. 798 P.2d 
950 (Utah App. 1989). 
A.J. Dean's Brief argues that proffered evidence is insufficient, and cites Larsen v. 
Colina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that defendants have a right to be 
present at such a heaiing. A.J. Dean thus argues that the Court ened by allowing evidence 
to be presented by sworn proffer, and by precluding it from conducting cross-examination. 
The Roberts submit that A.J. Dean's argument fails for three reasons. First, the Court 
did conduct a hearing and all damages were established by testimony subject to cross-
examination. Not only did the Roberts present sworn proffers, but they also took the stand 
and answered questions on A.J. Dean's cross-examination. The Roberts also called Brent 
Thomas, a structural engineer, who testified as to damages. A.J. Dean had a full opportunity 
to cross-examine Mr. Thomas on the issue of damages. In fact, the only limitation placed 
on A.J. Dean's cross-examination of all witnesses was the trial court's directive that cross-
examination be limited to the issue of damages, and not address liability. In short, A.J. Dean 
did have a full and fair opportunity to cross examine all witnesses on the issue of liability. 
Second, both the Rule and the case cited by A.J. Dean allow the court substantial 
discretion. The rule requires only such proceedings as the court deems "necessaiy and 
proper," while Larsen provides that the court may conduct a hearing, and is silent regarding 
the degree to which a defaulting party would be allowed to participate. Thus, the only real 
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question on appeal is whether the amount of damages is supported by "competent evidence." 
In this case, A.J. Dean has offered no substantive challenge to the evidence upon which the 
damage calculations were based. 
And third, under Rule 55 (b)(2) it is clear that no hearing is necessary if the items of 
damages are all "sums certain." See Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). In 
Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products. Inc.. 722 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 
1983), the court explained that a hearing on damages for a judgment by default is not 
required when "the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment from definite 
figures contained in the documentaiy evidence or detailed affidavits." Under this standard, 
the sums certain established at the damages hearing by sworn proffer were sufficient to 
establish the amounts in question.6 
In this case, each element of damages claimed was for a sum certain and was 
established by competent evidence. The Coiut awarded $7,960.00 for repair of the driveway 
based on documentaiy evidence of bid to complete such work. The Court awarded $170.00 
and $490.00 as the actual cost of repairing the rain gutters and landscaping respectively. The 
Court awarded $10,900.00 as the statutory penalty for wrongful lien, which calculation A J. 
Dean has not disputed. And the Court awarded $9,458.00 for lost oppoitunity in refinancing 
the Roberts' mortgage, which amount was fixed by testimony at the time default was 
originally entered. Thus, every amount of damages included in the Judgment was a sum 
Significantly, while A.J. Dean assails the manner in which the hearing was held, it offers 
no argument supported by citation to the record calling into question the amounts of damages 
fixed by the Court. The Roberts submit that it is incumbent on A.J. Dean to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the evidence as to any point of damages he wishes to challenge. A.J. Dean's 
Brief makes no effort to make such a showing. 
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certain based on competent evidence including documents, testimony, and the sworn proffer 
of counsel The Court clearly fulfilled the mandate of Rule 55 (b)(2) by conducting hearings 
which, to borrow the language of the rule, were "necessary and proper" under the 
circumstances. 
B. The Award of Punitive Damages was Appropriate, 
A. J. Dean's Brief suggests that the $5,000.00 punitive damage award in this case was 
not warranted because A J. Dean was not allowed to participate in the hearing. In fact, A.J. 
Dean was able to paiticipate in the healing to a degree beyond that necessaiy to satisfy Rule 
55 (b)(2). Specifically, the trial court allowed A.J. Dean a full opportunity to cross examine 
witnesses Scot Roberts, Brenda Roberts, and Jaryl Rencher as to all issues relative to 
punitive damages. (See R2386, at 97-183). The trial court also heard extensive argument 
of counsel relative to the issue. (R.2386, at 211-25). In short, the trial court went beyond 
the requirements of Rule 55 (b)(2) in establishing that punitive damages were warranted 
based on clear and convincing evidence. 
A.J. Dean also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the award. In 
fact, the trial court did in fact make sufficient findings to support the award of punitive 
damages. Under Utah law, punitive damages are warranted where conduct is willful and 
malicious or manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others. Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989). In its ruling, the 
trial court described the conduct of A.J. Dean as follows: 
In entering its order regarding default and A.J. Dean's motions, this Court 
determined among other things that there had been a willful pattern of delay 
in A.J. Dean's actions and a willful failure on the part of A.J. Dean to comply 
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with discovery orders and respond to discovery requests. Further, the Court 
stated that A.J. Dean had not conducted itself appropriately and that there had 
been a dramatic lack of cooperation on the part of A.J. Dean, prejudicing 
Roberts. 
(R1570, 1573.)7 
In general, tiial courts are granted a broad measure of discretion in weighing the 
appropriate factors and deteimining an appropriate award of punitive damages, and the tiial 
court's decision will not be disturbed in its conclusions absent an abuse of discretion. Amica 
7The Court's conclusion is further supported by the following findings made in the Court's 
bench ruling at the hearing on damages: 
Because of the recalcitrance of A.J. Dean, which is plainly 
demonstrated, even by their own pleadings in the case, there has been a 
consistent and clear course of conduct by A.J. Dean since the beginning, 
well since they, at first made efforts to attempt to collect its bill in the 
unlawful manner in which it did, misconduct, willful and malicious behavior 
o the part of A.J. Dean, bad faith, deception and A.J. Dean now makes the 
argument that the first call to Mrs. Roberts was one to two minutes and all 
they wanted—all they said was that she would—have that she and her 
husband would have to pay the bill or else the house would be sold in three 
days. 
That is an astonishing statement to make. I have yet to hear any 
case in which I have ever been involved as a judge or an attorney, of a 
collector making a call like that and threatening a home owner out of the 
blue with such a claim. It is highly offensive, it is highly inappropriate and 
with no other evidence about A.J. Dean's conduct, in my opinion, 
constitutes conduct that warrants punitive damages. 
But there is more, even after the conversation with Mr. Rencher 
and Mr. Rencher indicated that there was no valid claim for the lien 
against the Roberts, A.J. Dean went out and yet again misconducted itself 
in a way that was clearly willful, malicious and in bad faith. 
Inferentially, that also adds to the previous conduct that this is a— 
clearly suggestive of a cjurse of business conduct by A.J. Dean and how it 
collects its bills from its customers. 
And I don't think there is any question whatsoever about the 
punitive, about the inappropriate, malicious, willful conduct about A.J. 
Dean. 
(R2384, at 9-10) 
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Mut. Tns. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah App. 1989). In this case, it is clear that 
the trial court was well within its discretion in awarding punitive damages based upon the 
willful and malicious conduct of A.J. Dean. 
III. WAS THE DISTRICT COURT REQUIRED TO VACATE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE ROBERTS' 
COUNSEL HAD AN UNKNOWN CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
ARISING AFTER THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT. 
A.J. Dean accurately cites Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for the 
proposition that a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation is directly adverse 
to another client, unless both clients consent after consultation. In fact, there is no doubt in 
this case that when Mr. Rencher's firm began representing A.J. Dean's as counsel for its 
insurer, Rencher was required to obtain consent or withdraw. 
From that premise, A.J. Dean makes the argument that the Default Judgment should 
be vacated because it was tainted by the conflict of interest. By A.J. Dean's own admission, 
that argument has never been accepted by any Utah court, and the Roberts urge this Court 
to reject it here. First, Rencher acted appropriately in all respects in this case. The parties 
do not dispute that as soon as the conflict was discovered, Rencher took appropriate action 
to withdraw. Withdrawal, of course, is the remedy prescribed by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct when conflicts arise. A.J. Dean fails to explain why Rencher's withdrawal was not 
fully sufficient to vindicate the policies of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described 
in Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (Utah 1985). 
Second, no prejudice arose from the representation. In Parkinson v. Phonex Corp.. 
857 F.Supp. 1474 (D.Utah 1994), the court emphasize the absence of prejudice as a factor 
-24-
to consider in application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There, one attorney 
represented a plaintiff in litigation while his partner represented a named defendant on other 
matters. On the defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, the court held that 
because the partner had withdrawn as soon as he became aware of the conflict, and because 
there was no evidence of information exchanged between the partners relative to the 
representation, the plaintiffs attorney was not disqualified from continuing.8 
In this case, A.J. Dean fails to explain any way in which Rencher gained an advantage 
in representing the Roberts based on his firm's representation of A.J. Dean's insurer. In fact, 
where Rencher was not even aware of the conflict until immediately prior to his withdrawal, 
it is safe to assume that the conflict provided Rencher with no benefit at all. Because A.J. 
Dean has suffered no prejudice from the conflicting representation and because Rencher 
withdrew as soon as the conflict became known, A.J. Dean's request for relief is without 
basis. 
Finally, A.J. Dean failed to preserve this issue in the trial court. Although the court 
was aware that a conflict had arisen and that Mr. Rencher was required to withdraw, A.J. 
Dean made no motion to vacate the entry of default or to obtain any other relief on that basis. 
In fact, the first time A J. Dean suggested that the Judgment was somehow tainted by the Mr. 
Rencher's conflict of interest was in the Brief recently filed with this Court. The Roberts 
submit that if the issue would have been raised below, and if the trial court would have 
perceived some prejudice arising from the conflicting representation, the trial court could 
8The Roberts note that disqualification of counsel and not setting aside of final judgment is 
the appropriate issue in cases arising under Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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have taken appropriate steps to remedy the prejudice. A.J. Dean's failure to make any such 
request below prevents it from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Roberts urge this Court to affirm the 
Judgment of the Trial Court in every respect. The Roberts further request an award of their 
attorney fees incuired in defending this appeal on the basis that they were adjudicated to be 
entitled to an award of fees in the trial court, and are therefore entitled to fees on appeal. 
DATED this _$_ day of March, 1998. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, V.C. 
Reid W. Lambert 
Michelle A. Ontiveros 
Attorney for Appellees 
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ORDER REGARDING SANCTIONS 
AND COMPELLING A.J. DEAN'S 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 930901740CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, plaintiffs, Scot and Brenda Roberts, and third-party 
0 0 0 0 3 9 
defendant and counterelaimant, Sheila Roberts (hereinafter, 
collectively, "Roberts"), have filed a motion to compel and for 
sanctions to compel discovery from A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. 
The Court, having considered Roberts' motion and A.J. Dean & 
Sons, Inc.'s opposition thereto, and having held a hearing on the 
saiu 3 on March 21, 1994, and considering the argument raised by 
counsel for the parties and otherwise being fully advised as to the 
law and the facts and the record in this case and for good cause 
shown, now hereby grants Roberts' motion to compel and for 
sanctions and orders A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. to answer Interrogatory 
Nos. 23 and 26 from Roberts' first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents, Nos. 2 and 4 from Roberts' 
first set of requests for production of documents, and to answer 
all of Roberts' second set of discovery requests to A.J. Dean & 
Sons, Inc. A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. are ordered to answer this 
discovery by April 5, 1994. In the event that A.J. Dean & Sons, 
Inc. does not comply with this order, Roberts may, ex parte, submit 
an affidavit and motion to strike A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc.'s 
pleadings and for entry of default against them. 
The Court also hereby finds that Roberts' request for attorney 
fees and costs is appropriate and grants the same. 
The Court, having considered the affidavit of Roberts' counsel 
and finding the charges in it both reasonable and necessary, hereby 
orders defendant A.J. Dean to pay Roberts $501.50 in costs and 
attorney fees. 
2 
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The Court, also considering the affidavit of fees and costs 
related to Roberts7 motion to compel from defendants Muir and the 
Court having already granted Roberts' motion against those 
defendants and finding the costs and attorney fees reasonable and 
necessary, hereby orders defendants Muir to pay Roberts $369.00 in 
costs and attorney fees. 
DATED this sf&~--day of VJs^fVA3( 1994. 
BY^  THE COURT 
Gu^ 
Honorable Anne M. S 
District Court Judoe 
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1 days, as counsel pointed out, to act upon your Honor's order. 
2 And I think most importantly your Honor's order 
3 allowed me to come into chambers and seek it ex parte and 
4 proffer damages. And I didn't do that. I notified all of 
5 counsel because, as I did with our motion against Mr. Muir, I 
6 didn't want there to be any question — notwithstanding your 
7 Honor's suggestion that ex parte was appropriate — I didn't 
8 want there to be any question that I was trying to notify all 
9 counsel of my concerns. 
10 I'll submit on that, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. 
12 It appears to the Court there has been activity on 
13 the part of A.J. Dean after the appearance of Mr. Berry and 
14 Ms. Lund into the case. As I said, I don't think there is 
15 any problem at all with notice here. I don't think there has 
16 been any lack of courtesy shown here. 
17 Notice was given. Counsel for A.J. Dean was 
18 present on March 21st. It's my recollection, I may be 
19 mistaken about this and it's not a major point, but I believe 
20 I even asked whether that would be enough time of 
21 Mr. Marshall at that hearing, whether April 5th would be 
22 enough time to respond, and because I didn't want there to be 
23 another problem like this. 
24 The arguments Mr. Berry has advanced would be very 
25 compelling to the Court if this were not the second time we 
^z 
1 were dealing with these kinds of problems in formal motions. 
2 The answers were not timely filed, contrary to the Court's 
3 order. That followed recognition by the Court that the 
4 answers hadn't been given timely in accordance with the Rules 
5 of Civil Procedure. There has been a pattern of delay. 
6 There has been a pattern on the part of A.J. Dean of not 
7 being fully responsive. The Motion for Extension of Time was 
8 not timely filed. 
9 With regard to the comment that the Court's order 
10 was signed April 7 indicating an April 5 deadline, the 
11 parties were fully aware of when the deadline was. The order 
12 was presented to the Court and the Court waited five days 
13 plus three days mailing before entering that order to make 
14 sure there was no objection to that order. There was no 
15 objection to that order. 
16 Also, I am concerned that the responses that were 
17 filed frankly don't appear to be fully responsive even at 
18 this point. It seems to me that there is a time to call 
19 enough enough. And I think this is it. 
20 It seems to me that A.J. Dean has not conducted 
21 itself appropriately. It certainly hasn't complied with the 
22 Court order. And I don't think that parties on the other 
23 side are obligated to go to the great extent that they have, 
24 the Roberts have gone to in this case to get what they are 
25 entitled to without filing any motions. 
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1 As I say, if this were the first conversation we 
2 were having about this, I might view this significantly 
3 differently. But it isn't. And so — 
4 Also in my mind there is no lack of clarity about 
5 substitution of counsel. It was clear Mr. Marshall intended 
6 to withdraw. That was the whole — that was even discussed 
7 here today. And the rules clearly do not permit counsel to 
8 withdraw when there are pending motions because of concerns 
9 of delay. And I have those concerns in this case that there 
10 might be delay if the Court permitted withdrawal. That's why 
11 withdrawal was not permitted before this time. 
12 A party has every right to have as many counsel as 
13 a party wishes, in my opinion. But the party that chooses to 
14 do so must see to it that counsel have an obligation to 
15 communicate with one another. 
16 I am not trying to sound overly critical of 
17 counsel here. That's not my intent. But the facts are that 
18 there has been a dramatic lack of cooperation on the part of 
19 A.J. Dean and failure to comply with the Court's order. 
20 I think I am well within my discretion in granting 
2\ the relief that the plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the 
22 Answers of A.J. Dean are hereby stricken and default judgment 
23 is entered against A.J. Dean. The motion is granted. 
24 I want Mr. Rencher to prepare an order consistent 
25 with that ruling. 
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Judge Anne M. Stirba 
On Monday, June 27, 1994, the parties through counsel appeared 
before the Court. Plaintiffs and third-party defendant and third-
party crossclaimant were represented by Jaryl L. Rencher; Milton 
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Muir Construction Company, Milton Muir and Katheryne Muir were 
represented by Randy Birch; and A.J. Dean was represented by 
Randall Marshall and Scott Berry. Before the Court were Roberts' 
motion for summary judgment against all defendants, Roberts' 
objection to A.J. Dean's attempt to substitute counsel, Roberts' 
opposition to the request of A.J. Dean's counsel to withdraw and 
appearance of co-counsel on behalf of A.J. Dean, Roberts' motion to 
strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and for entry of default for A.J. 
Dean's failure to comply with this Court's prior order and 
discovery responsibilities, A.J. Dean's motion for additional time 
to answer discovery and Roberts' objection thereto, A.J. Dean's 
motion for relief from Court's orders and Roberts' opposition 
thereto, Roberts' motion to amend complaint, Roberts' motion for 
partial summary judgment, A.J. Dean's motion for summary judgment, 
attorney Randall Marshall's motion to withdraw, and A.J. Dean's 
objection to service of pleadings. 
Counsel was given opportunity to fully brief the Court on 
these matters and to argue the same before the bench. 
The Court, being fully advised as to the law, the facts, the 
record in this case, its prior rulings and orders, the 
participation of counsel and the arguments raised, and while 
incorporating herein its entire rulings on March 21, 1994, and 




FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 21, 1994, after A.J. Dean had repeatedly failed 
to comply with the rules of discovery as described by plaintiffs in 
their memorandum in support of their motion to compel, incorporated 
herein by this reference, this Court ordered A.J. Dean to respond 
to discovery by April 5, 1994. Counsel for A.J. Dean was present 
in court for the ruling and received a copy and never opposed the 
form of the proposed order reflecting this ruling. The Court's 
conclusions and ruling made that date as well as the statement of 
facts and argument (adopted by the Court and raised by Roberts in 
i 
seeking the Court's March 21, 1994 ruling) are hereby incorporated 
into the Court's findings. 
2. As part of its March 21, 1994 ruling, this Court had 
considered the argument raised by counsel for the parties and was 
otherwise fully advised as to the law, the facts and the record in 
this case and for good cause granted Roberts' motion to compel and 
for sanctions and ordered A.J. Dean to answer certain discovery 
previously propounded on it by April 5, 1994. The Court concluded: 
"In the even that A.J. Dean and Sons, Inc., does not comply with 
this order, Roberts may, ex parte, submit an affidavit and motion 
to strike A.J. Dean and Sons, Inc.'s pleadings and for entry of 
default against them." 
3. During the March 21, 1994 hearing, counsel for A.J. Dean 
was present (Mr. Randall Marshall) and the Court asked that counsel 
whether there would be enough time for A.J. Dean to respond to the 
3 
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discovery ordered by April 5, and A.J. Dean's counsel indicated 
that would be sufficient. 
4. Also as part of its ruling on March 21, 1994, the Court 
found that Roberts' request for attorney fees and costs was 
appropriate and granted the same. 
5. On or about March 28, 1994, without court approval or 
order, attorney Julie Lund attempted to substitute herself for 
Mr. Randall Marshall as A.J. Dean's counsel in this case. 
6. On April 6, 1994, Mr. Marshall, counsel for A.J. Dean, 
participated in a telephone conference requested by this Court 
dealing with issues of defendant Muirs' own failure to respond to 
this Court's earlier order regarding a discovery deadline on March 
25, 1994, 
7. In that April 6, 1994 telephone conference, the Court 
indicated to counsel for A.J. Dean (Randall Marshall) that he could 
not withdraw as counsel or be substituted without an order of this 
Court. 
8. On April 11, 1994, attorneys Green & Berry entered their 
appearance as co-counsel in this case since they were not 
authorized to substitute themselves as counsel for Mr. Marshall. 
9. Having not received A.J. Dean's discovery pursuant to 
this Count's March 21, 1994 ruling, Roberts' counsel called Green 
& Berry on April 12 and April 13, 1994, and requested the Court's 
ordered discovery. Also on or about April 13, 1994, plaintiffs' 
4 
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counsel again reminded Green & Berry of the Court's March 21, 1994 
ruling and provided a copy of that order to Green & Berry. 
10. A.J. Dean never timely responded or complied with this 
Court's order of March 21, 1994, or the repeated courtesy requests 
of Roberts' counsel to receive the discovery answers. 
11. During this entire period A.J. Dean and Sons was 
represented by counsel. 
12. In full compliance with this Court's ruling or March 21, 
1994, and after courteously (but without result or response) 
providing A.J. Dean's counsel with a copy of the Court's proposed 
order and contacting Green & Berry three times regarding the same 
(even though such contact was not required by this Court's rules or 
rulings), on or about April 18, 1994, Roberts filed their motion to 
strike defendant A.J. Dean's pleadings and for entry of default. 
This motion was courteously served upon A.J. Dean even though the 
Court's March 21, 1994 order expressly stated that Roberts could 
make this motion ex-parte. 
13. A.J. Dean has not alleged that it and its counsel at all 
material times in this matter, Randall Marshall, did not receive 
everything filed with this Court. 
14. Not only was A.J. Dean's counsel Randall Marshall fully 
advised as to the facts and all papers filed with this Court, but 
the record also reflects that the Court did not sign its order 
regarding its March 21, 1994 ruling until eight days after A.J. 
Dean was served with a copy of the Court's order, which period gave 
5 
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A.J. Dean sufficient time under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration to object to the form of the order. No 
objection was filed, and to date no objection has been made to that 
order as not reflecting the Court's ruling. 
15. Although A.J. Dean claims that Mr. Scott Berry earlier 
appeared as counsel in this case (based upon a March 29, 1994 
"substitution of counsel" that does not even list his name), 
substitution of counsel had not been authorized by the Court and 
such authorization was required by this Court's rules given pending 
motions. Further, Roberts repeatedly opposed the withdrawal of 
A.J. Dean's attorney Randall Marshall due to pending motions. 
16. Also, contrary to A.J. Dean's allegations, Ms. Julie Lund 
was timely placed on the certificate of service, even though she 
had not appeared as counsel. 
17. A.J. Dean has made no attempt to represent to the Court 
the types of admissions or the responses that would be made to 
plaintiffs' request for admissions if the Court were to allow A.J. 
Dean to withdraw the same, and there is no evidence that any 
individual on behalf of A.J. Dean was willing to sign any proposed 
responses; in fact, the evidence of record indicated no one would 
sign proposed responses on behalf of A.J. Dean. 
18. On June 27, 1994, the Court heard from counsel concerning 
the motions and matters listed above, and A.J. Dean admitted, 
through counsel, that Randall Marshall had not been given leave of 
court to withdraw, which leave was required by this Court's rules. 
6 
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A.J. Dean's counsel also admitted it knew of no legal support for 
its claim that several attorneys acting on behalf of A.J. Dean, in 
a single matter, with or without court approval, were entitled to 
be served with a copy of all papers filed with the Court. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. While attorneys Green & Berry for the first time on 
April 14, 1994, requested additional time to answer this discovery, 
there has been no good cause shown for why A.J. Dean has not 
complied with this Court's express orders regarding discovery, even 
though A.J. Dean has been at all times represented by counsel in 
this case. Further, A.J. Dean's motion to extend time to respond 
to discovery ignores the fact that Green & Berry were not counsel 
for A.J. Dean in this case and that A.J. Dean's attorney Mr. 
Randall Marshall received the Court's orders and appeared in open 
court when the Court ruled that A.J. Dean had only until April 5, 
1994, to answer the discovery. 
2. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) the time for enlarging 
discovery without A.J. Dean showing "excusable neglect" has run, 
and A.J. Dean has not shown excusable neglect. 
3. Roberts have been prejudiced and have incurred 
considerable time and expense trying to compel defendants to comply 
with discovery responsibilities. Defendants, although represented 
by counsel at all times, have ignored the orders of this Court and 
have not demonstrated good cause for why additional time to comply 
7 
with this Court's order ought to be allowed. Accordingly Roberts 
are entitled to an order granting their motion to strike A.J. 
Dean's pleadings and to enter default against A.J. Dean. 
4. The objection to unserved pleadings filed by Green & 
Berry on April 14, 1994, is erroneous and has no effect as a matter 
of law. A.J. Dean's counsel essentially acknowledged Rule 5(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure only requires that Roberts serve 
all matters upon the party's "attorney." Nowhere in this Court's 
rules were Roberts required to serve pleadings upon attorneys that 
had improperly attempted a substitution of counsel without order of 
this Court required by Rule 4-506(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
5. Further, the objection to unserved pleadings by attorneys 
Green & Berry is without merit since the record reflects Green 
& Berry attempted to appear on this case on April 11, 1994, and 
there is no claim in their objection now before this Court that any 
matters were filed after April 11, 1994, to which A.J. Dean or 
attorneys Berry & Green did not receive notice. 
6. The Court rejects A.J. Dean's claim that Roberts' counsel 
should have sent attorneys Green & Berry matters that were filed 
before Green & Berry were entitled to act as counsel in this case. 
7. Even if the Court were inclined to adopt A.J. Dean's 
claim, which it does not, attorney Raymond Scott Berry did not 
enter his appearance in this action on March 29, 1994. As the 
record reflects,- he only properly entered that appearance (as co-
8 
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counsel) some two weeks later on April 11, 1994. At that time A.J. 
Dean had in all respects been represented by counsel. 
8. No objection was filed, and to date no objection has been 
made to the form of the Court's orders as not reflecting the 
Court's ruling. 
9. The attempted substitution of Julie Lund on March 29, 
1994, was not authorized under Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration as Mr. Marshall was not authorized to 
withdraw. This Court informed A.J. Dean's counsel of that fact in 
its telephone conference initiated to counsel on April 6, 1994. 
Accordingly, even if this Court accepts A.J. Dean's claim that 
three co-counsel in any case should be provided duplicative copies 
of ^11 matters filed, Mr. Berry was not an attorney properly 
appearing in this case until April 11, 1994. 
10. A.J. Dean evidently knew this fact as it failed in its 
own certificates of service to copy Mr. Randall Marshall of the 
papers Mr. Berry filed. 
11. A.J. Dean has effectively conceded the point that at all 
times material herein it was represented by Mr. Randall Marshall 
who has never been authorized to withdraw under Rule 4-506(a). If 
A.J. Dean has a dispute with whether its attorney failed to comply 
with the Court's March 21, 1994 order requiring A.J. Dean to answer 
all outstanding discovery by April 5, 1994, that dispute does not 
involve Roberts. Likewise, if A.J. Dean's co-counsel has a dispute 
with information he was or was not provided by A.J. Dean's counsel 
9 
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who appeared in that March 21, 1994 hearing, that argument is also 
irrelevant to Roberts7 claims in this case. This Court cannot 
allow A.J. Dean to penalize Roberts (who have at all times complied 
with discovery responsibilities) as a result of disputes between 
A.J. Dean and its respective counsel as to who was required to 
comply with the Court's March 21, 1994 order. 
12. The record belies any claim that Roberts did not object 
to the attempted withdrawal by Mr. Randall Marshall as counsel for 
A.J. Dean in this case as the record demonstrates that two such 
objections were filed. 
13. While A.J. Dean effectively claims that A.J. Dean was 
somehow prejudiced by Mr. Berry's inability to participate in a 
telephone conference scheduled by the Court on April 6, 1994, 
Mr. Berry had not filed an actual appearance as of that time and it 
was for A.J. Dean's counsel who was present to educate the Court if 
Mr. Berry should have been involved in that telephone 
communication. Again, A.J. Dean's dispute, if any, is with its 
attorneys. It would be inappropriate to penalize Roberts for any 
lack of communication between A.J. Dean's purported "co-counsel." 
14. Nowhere in this Court's rules were Roberts required to 
serve pleadings upon attorneys that had attempted a substitution of 
counsel without the order of this Court required by Rule 4-506(1) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Further, if one of 
A.J. Dean's attorneys thought that another should be further 
involved in communications with the Court, that attorney had every 
10 
opportunity to raise this point and chose not to do so. Nowhere in 
any of the documents on file with this Court has A.J. Dean's 
attorney, Mr. Marshall, claimed by sworn affidavit or otherwise 
that} (1) he did not receive, as A.J. Dean's counsel, all material 
matters that were filed in this case, (2) he did not appear on 
March 21, 1994, as counsel for A.J. Dean when the Court ordered 
A.JH Dean to comply with discovery responsibilities by April 5, 
1994, and (3) he did not participate in the telephone conversation 
with the Court on April 6, 1994. To the contrary, the record 
reflects the fact that A.J. Dean appeared through counsel and was 
properly served with all filings in this case. 
' 15. A.J. Dean has failed to comply with any obligation to 
demonstrate that it is entitled to relief on the grounds of 
inadvertent surprise and/or excusable neglect. In contrast, as 
demonstrated in the record, although no rule of or ruling by this 
Court required it, before Roberts' counsel filed a motion to strike 
and for entry of default, he contacted the law offices of Green & 
Berry several times before submitting Roberts' motion for default, 
which motion had been earlier authorized by this Court. 
[ 16. Under Rule 37(b)(2), this Court was well within its 
discretion to compel this discovery and is now well within its 
I 
discretion under subparagraph (c) thereof to strike A.J. Dean's 
pleadings and grant Roberts a default judgment. A.J. Dean has 
consistently and willfully failed to comply with this Court's 
orders and A.J. Dean's discovery responsibilities, even to the 
11 
point when the Court in open court on March 21, 1994, gave it one 
more chance to do so and entered an order of attorney fees in favor 
of Roberts. A.J. Dean chose not to respond, even though it was at 
all times representf i by counsel. In contrast, Roberts and their 
crinsel have at all times complied with this Court's rules and 
rulings and courteous practice and have been prejudiced by A.J. 
Dean's inappropriate and willful disregard for this Court's orders 
and what must be viewed as an intent to hinder or delay discovery. 
To allow A.J. Dean, without any evidence, to avoid this Court's 
orders and its willful behavior by simply claiming "excusable 
neglect" or inadvertence of surprise would be to sanction an abuse 
of process and would further prejudice Roberts. 
17. Contrary to the representations in A.J. Dean's 
memorandum, Roberts have demonstrated to the Court the severe 
prejudice that would result if this Court sets aside its order and 
does not grant Roberts' motion to strike A.J. Dean's pleadings and 
for default. Further, Roberts have incurred substantial attorney 
fees, and there is no representation in A.J. Dean's memorandum that 
in exchange for late discovery and failure to comply with court 
order it will pay Roberts' attorney fees. And, contrary to its 
claim that the attorney fees should not have been awarded against 
it, those fees were awarded based upon its first failure to comply 
with discovery as required under the mandatory language of Rule 37 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
12 
18. Nowhere in its memorandum has A.J. Dean cited this Court 
to a single case in support of its position. In contrast, a review 
of Utah case law demonstrates that A.J. Dean has not established 
inadvertence, excusable neglect or surprise to set aside the 
Court's default judgment even if plaintiffs' motion was timely at 
this juncture. 
19. Utah law provides that discovery answers that are 
attempted to be filed after a motion to compel or for sanctions is 
filed will not avoid the granting of a motion for sanctions or 
I 
relief. 
20. In this case and under the facts as they occurred, A.J. 
Dean's willful failure to comply with this Court's prior orders and 
to respond to discovery is not insignificant. The Court 
references, incorporates and acknowledges its order signed April 7, 
1994, and entered March 21, 1994, regarding sanctions and 
compelling A.J. Dean's response to recovery. 
21. The Court is concerned by its finding that this is the 
second time the Court has had to deal with these kinds of problems 
in formal motions insofar as A.J. Dean's willful failure to comply 
with discovery responsibilities. 
22. The Court concludes that A.J. Dean's answers to discovery 
were not timely filed contrary to the Court's order, which followed 
recognition by the Court that A.J. Dean's answers had not been 
given timely in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Court concludes that there has been a willful pattern of delay by 
13 
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A.J. Dean and a willful pattern on the part of A.J. Dean of not 
being fully responsive. The Court also concludes that the motion 
for extension of time was not timely filed. 
23. The Court also concludes that the responses that A.J. 
Dean filed do not appear to be fully responsive even at this point 
and that A.J. Dean has not conducted itself appropriately. A.J. 
Dean has not complied with the Court's order and plaintiffs are not 
obligated to go to the great extent that they have in this case to 
obtain the discovery to which they are entitled without filing any 
motions. 
24. Prior to its hearing on June 27, 1994, the Court also did 
not allow Mr. Marshall to withdraw in this case in order that the 
Court could avoid any concerns of delay. 
25. A party has every right to have as many counsel as a 
party wishes, but the party that chooses to do so (in this case 
A.J. Dean) must see to it that counsel have an obligation to 
communicate with one another. To the extent this was not done, 
A.J. Dean may not place the responsibility or blame for the same on 
plaintiffs. 
26. The Court concludes that there has been a dramatic lack 
of cooperation on the part of A.J. Dean and failure to comply with 
the Court's March 21, 1994 and April 7, 1994 orders. Accordingly, 
the Court is within its discretion in granting the relief 
plaintiffs seek and the pleadings of A.J. Dean are thus stricken 
14 
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and default judgment is entered against A.J. Dean. Plaintiffs' 
motion is granted. 
27. As a result of the Court's order, A.J. Dean's motions for 
additional time to answer discovery and for relief from the Court's 
orders of March 21 and April 7, 1994, are denied. Further, A.J. 
Dean's objection to unserved pleadings is overruled and its motion 
for summary judgment denied. 
28. A.J. Dean's counsel is given until July 8 to file a 
subsequent motion on whether it is entitled to be heard on the 
issue of damages. 
29. The Court, having considered brief argument by 
plaintiffs' counsel as to other motions, the Court reserves for a 
later date ruling on Roberts' remaining motions including Roberts' 
motion to amend complaint and for partial summary judgment. The 
Court will also hold a hearing on the issue of damages Roberts are 
entitled to receive from A.J. Dean. This hearing on damages 
against A.J. Dean will be held subsequent to a hearing scheduled 
for August 23, 1994, to consider A.J. Dean's request that it be 
heard in respect to plaintiffs' presentation of damages to be 
awarded against it. . 
DATED this i& day of 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judg 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Well, I've considered the 
evidence and arguments, Counsel, and on most of these 
issues, I'm prepared to rule, except for the ones that I 
specifically set aside. 
' First of all, there was also a motion to strike 
and that has not been erased by counsel. That has--that is 
the motion by the plaintiffs to strike the memorandum and 
proposed--
MR. LAMBERT: Pioffer. 
THE COURT: --proffer of evidence by 
A.J. Dean. And the Court hereby strikes that motion--or--or 
rather, grants that motion and also because--I'11 strike 
that motion—or grant that motion. 
Was there a request for attorney's fees in 
connection with that motion? I don't happen to recall. 
MR. LAMBERT: NOf 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAMBERT: And it wouldn't be very 
much, if there were, so I'll waive my claims. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
As to the liquidated damages, the Court has 



























satisfaction, subject to check, if — I'm assuming that the 
date given in the proceedings is correct and I've not 
independently assessed it, but if that's the date, then I 
entered the order of the default and that is the effective 
date, and not a prior date. 
A bench ruling is only a bench ruling and this one 
is, it's effective when it's reduced to writing and there's 
an opportunity for objection to that and then I enter the 
order. Not even when I sign it is it entered, it's when 
it's entered by the clerk of the court, the case law is 
quite clear about that. 
So, those dates, assuming that it is that December 
5th day, 1994, and subject to check Mr. Lambert's 
mathematical calculation, judgment is entered in the amount 
of $10,900. 
With regard to the repair of the driveway, I am 
satisfied that, based on the Court's previous rulings and 
notwithstanding the argument that it is claimed that somehow 
it wasn't necessary, the Court has found that that is a 
damage figure. The concrete, itself, that's what the 
essence of this lawsuit is all about and judgment has been 
awarded from the bench based on the prima facie showing. 
Therefore, the best evidence of what the repair of 
the driveway is, is $7,960.01. The Court, I'll show, enter 





 With regard to the repair of the rain gutter, the 
2
 two figures that were produced was $100 and then $170, and 
3
 the Court awards the amtfunt that--the amount of $170. That 
4
 is because the—that is the cost as of the date of trial, if 
5 I you will, on the issue of damages 
And so even if that figure were to go up following 
7
 today, but after the date that judgment — after this date, 
8 but before a judgment is entered in this case, the $170 
^ J figure will control 
The repair of the lawn. There is evidence about 
that, it's undisputed. A judgment shall enter in the amount 
12
 | of $490 
13
 I The Court reserves the issue of the attorney's 
14
 I fees and there will be a briefing by the plaintiffs on the 
issues of the—on whether attorney's fees are appropriate 
and recoverable in actions to quiet title, whether they're 
17 J recoverable as special damages under a slander of title 
13
 I claim and whether attorney's fees are recoverable as —as 
19 I consequential damages based on the claim that they are the 
natural and foreseeable consequences of the lien. So, the 
plaintiffs shall be able to brief that issue. 
22
 I With regard to the reasonableness and necessity of 
23
 fees, and--which has to do specifically with the issue of 
24
 whether the—what reasonable and necessarily incurred fees 
25






then whatever arguments are made as to how, if at all, those 
2 
fees should break down to the specific causes of action on 
which the judgment is being entered. That is something A.J. 
Dean may participate in. 
The briefing on that shall be--I would like to get 
this resolved as quickly as possible. Mr. Lambert, how 
quickly can you prepare this--that--that, in essence, 
written closing argument I want to see on that issue— 9
 I MR. LAMBERT: Well, I wish--
10
















other three matters? 
MR. LAMBERT: I wish I could tell you I 
could do it faster, but I really don't have any time at all 
this week. I'm going out of town on Thursday. I could 
certainly do it by a week from Friday. 
THE COURT: The 23rd of August? 
MR. LAMBERT: Right. 
THE COURT: All right. Then that needs 
to be filed with the Court no later than 5:00 p.m. on 
Friday, August 23rd. 
Mr. Berry, is there any reason why you could not 
respond to that within ten days as you would a motion? 
MR. BERRY: There is, your Honor. I'm 
glad you're giving me an opportunity to mention this. I'm 






































































































And do so. Five 
that, if any, and in accordance 
MR. LAMBERT 
with 
: Your Honor, my argument's 
reasonableness and neces — the 
the necessit y of fees as to these special 
three causes of action? 
THE COURT: No. No. You don't address 
the special three causes of action at all. 
MR. LAMBERT: So, it's the 
reasonableness and necessity — 
THE COURT: It's only, in essence, 
closing argument on the issues of whether attorney's fees 
can—should be awarded— 


























among the c1 aims? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Apportionment among 
the defendants and among the claims themselves. That's what 
your closing arguments needs to be--needs to be addressed 
to. 
Attorney's fees will be awarded, at least in part, 
because the Court has ruled that way as to the mechanic's 
1i ens. 
The question is then, based on the evidence, can 
the Court assess what those fees are pertaining to that or 
any other specific cause of action based on the evidence in 
which you have participated and whether—what your closing 




Dean and any 







COURT: All right. Now, 
to punitive damages. This has 
-this case has—was filed in-
would not have even been filed in District Court 
not been claims re 







lated to quiet title and other 







limits would have been too small. 
have those distinctions now o 
however, this — the bottom lin 
» first involved was 
f District 
e, what this 



























gutter, lawn and those—those specific damages. 
Because of the recalcitrance of A.J. Dean, which 
is plainly demonstrated, even by their own pleadings in the 
case, there has been a consistent and clear course of 
conduct by A.J. Dean since the beginning, well, since they, 
at first made efforts to attempt to collect its bill in the 
unlawful manner in which it did, misconduct, willful and 
malicious behavior on the part of A.J. Dean, bad faith, 
deception and A.J. Dean now makes the argument that the 
first call to Mrs. Roberts was one to two minutes and all 
they wanted—all they said was that she would have—that she 
and her husband would have to pay the bill or else the house 
would be sold within three days. 
That is an astonishing statement to make. I have 
yet to hear any case in which I have ever been involved as a 
judge or an attorney, of a collector making a call like that 
and threatening a home owner out of the blue with such a 
claim. It is highly offensive, it is highly inappropriate 
and with no other evidence about A.J. Dean's conduct, in my 
opinion, constitutes conduct that warrants punitive damages. 
But there is more, even after the conversation 
with Mr. Rencher and Mr. Rencher indicated that there was no 
valid claim for the lien against the Roberts, A.J. Dean went 
out and yet again misconducted itself in a way that was 



























Iaferentially, that also adds to the previous 
conduct that this is a —clearly suggestive of a course of 
business conduct by A.J. Dean and how it collects its bills 
from its customers. 
And I don't think there is any question whatsoever 
about the punitive, about the inappropriate, malicious, 
willful conduct about A.J. Dean. 
As to whether it's clear — established by clear and 
convincing, I would say in essence, it was essentially 
undisputed and I am aware, as Mr. Berry and A.J. Dean 
pointed out, on numerous, numerous occasions, that they have 
not been able to present evidence about this; however, that 
is through no one's fault but A.J. Dean's and how it has 
conducted itself in this case. 
This default—A.J. Dean's answer has been stricken 
and it stands as if it never answered in this case. It has 
very few rights after entry of default and the default was 
based on its misconduct, to—to appear and—and challenge 
any con—any—any evidence put forward by the plaintiffs. 
But clearly, it does not have an opportunity or a 
right to put on evidence in contradiction to the evidence as 
it is alleged in the complaint. 
in addition to that, if all of that were not 
enough, A.J. Dean clearly misconducted itself, knowingly, 



























individual sign the name of Craig Dean, purporting to be the 
signature of Craig Dean and then having that signature 
notarized, knowing that it is not the signature of A.J. Dean 
and that A.J. Dean did not, contrary to the notary's claim, 
under oath, appear before the notary and sign that specific 
document. 
And so clearly, the notary provisions and lien 
provisions have been undermined by the conduct of A.J. Dean. 
The--oh, it's the Robert Bagley telephone calls to 
the plaintiff about--to which 1 was referring before. 
Now, also, the letter by Roberts that Mr.--or 
letter to Hr. Roberts by Bagley that Mr. Roberts would be 
liable for costs and attorney's fees which occurred a few 
days after Mr. Rencher's conversation with A.3. Dean is the 
other example to which I was referring. 
I'm not including everything the Roberts may 
include in the findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
they proposed, additional evidence consistent with the 
evidence produced today; I am--this is merely a bench ruling 
and I will surely overlook some—some evidence. 
The fees of counsel in connection with these 
proceedings, Mr. Rencher of $85 an hour and Mr. Lambert of 
$110 an hour are both clearly reasonable and consistent with 
the standards in this legal community. 



























Dixie Bank, I believe it is, or vice versa, Dixie Bank vs. 
Bracken, on those factors. I will not bother to articulate 
all those factors here. This is an unusual case. 
Clearly, the legal fees far exceed what legal fees 
should have been, but the Court finds that those fees, to a 
tremendous extent, were incurred because of A.J. Dean's 
misconduct consistent—consistently in this case. 
With regard to Mr. Lambert's fees, the Court finds 
that one hundred percent or his time has been devoted to 
A.J. Dean issues and--and also as to the allocation of the 
attorney's fees, I am not going to reach that today because 
of the issue of briefing that needs to be done. 
As to Mr. Rencher's fees, I'm reserving on those 
issues as well. 
And other findings regarding reasonableness and 
necessity are--are reserved. 
I want Mr. Lambert to prepare proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and decree, and his attorney's 
fees incurred in connection with doing that and until this 
matter is resolved, may also be awarded consistent with the 
basis for the Court's rulings here today. 
That is the--the bench ruling of the Court. 
Is there anything I've overlooked? 
MR. LAMBERT: If you wanted to put a 
number on the punitive damage. 
12 
THE COURT: I'm going to wait to look at 
the whole picture before I do that. I think that--so, when 
you prepare that, you need to leave a blank for it. 
I--I want to look at all the findings, I want to 
consider the specials awarded and look at the--any--the 
6
 J resolution of all of the issues before I make that decision. 
7
 ' MR. LAMBERT: I appreciate that 
I'll — I'll submit also, at least it's my 
9
 J understanding, a similar type of thing with regard to fees, 
leaving enough blanks that the Court could--could fill it 
in, based on our--our pleadings. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
And the Court is adjourned at this time. 
MR. BERRY: Thank you, your Honor. 












































STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcr 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded 
received an electronically re 
matter and under his supervis 
into typewriting, and the for 
to 13, inclusive, to the best 
full, true and correct transc 
indicated the Videotape Recor 
inaudible. 
iber for Alan P. Smith, 
and a Certified Court 
Court Proceedings; that I 
corded videotape of the within 
ion have transcribed the same 
egoing pages, numbered from 1 
of my ability constitute a 
ription, except where it is 
ded Court Proceedings were 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of 
August, 19S6. 
W 
T r a n s c r i b e r u 
1 7t*h 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this x / c n day of 
August, 1996. 
( S E w 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH • I . \,r *"v— ~ v y — 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE N o t a r y P u b l i c 
MURRAY, UT 84107 r 
COMMISSION EXPWfcS 
DEC. 4, 1997 




























STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah, 
do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 13, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of 
August, 1996. 
( S E JUL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE-
MURRAY, UT 84107N 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4, 1997 
STATE OF UTAH 
15 
EXHIBIT "E" 
Nicholas E. Hales - #4045 
Reid W. Lambert - #5744 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERTS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., et al. 
Defendants. 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 930901740 CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing relative to 
the issue of damages as against Defendant A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. 
("A.J. Dean") on August 13, 1996. Prior to the hearing, the Court 
found and ordered that Defendant A.J. Dean was in default as a 
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Procedure for its failure timely to comply with the Court's Order 
compelling discovery. By an Order dated December 5, 1994, the 
Court ordered that Plaintiff appear at the August 13, 1997 hearing 
and present by proffer prima facie evidence establishing a factual 
basis for its claims against A.J. Dean set forth in its Second 
Amended Complaint ("Complaint"). The Court further ordered that 
Defendant, by its counsel, could not participate in the 
presentation of evidence except to cross-examine witnesses as to 
the issue of damages and to present argument. At the close of the 
hearing, the Court made its ruling on the record, but directed that 
further briefing be submitted on the issue of attorneys fees. 
Having now considered the evidence presented by proffer and live 
testimony at the hearing, having read the parties' written 
submissions, having heard argument, and being fully advised herein, 
the Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and Defendants are both residents of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
2. The claims at issue arose from transactions taking place 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their 
Second Claim for Relief, Trespass, as against Defendant A.J. Dean 
-2-
0 A o -i o 
in that A.J. Dean did enter the land of Plaintiffs without consent 
and did cause damage thereon. 
4. By virtue of Plaintiff's trespass, Plaintiffs suffered 
damages in the amount of $7,960.00 to replace their driveway, 
$170.00 to repair their damaged rain gutter, and $490.00 to repair 
their lawn and landscaping, for a total of $8,620.00. 
5. Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their 
Fourth Claim for Relief, Negligence, as against Defendant A.J. Dean 
in that A.J. Dean breached its duty of reasonable and ordinary care 
to Plaintiffs by damaging Plaintiffs property and installing a 
defective driveway at their residence. 
6. A.J. Dean's negligence has proximately caused damages to 
Plaintiffs in the total amount o£ $8,620.00 as broken down in 
paragraph 4 above. 
7. Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their 
Seventh Claim for Relief, Breach of Warranty, as against Defendant 
A.J. Dean, in that A.J. Dean had good reason to know the particular 
purpose for which the driveway was intended, A.J. Dean knew that 
the Plaintiffs were relying upon its skill and ability in providing 
materials for the job, and A.J. Dean failed to provide materials in 
a manner consistent with that warranty resulting in a defective 
driveway being installed. The Court further finds that the 
-3-
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warranty extends to the Plaintiffs, who were reasonably expected to 
use the driveway. 
8. A.J. Dean's breach of warranty directly damaged 
Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,960.01, as the cost of repairing and 
replacing the defective driveway. 
9. Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their 
Thirteenth claim for Relief, Satisfaction of Lien, as against 
Defendant A.J. Dean in that Plaintiffs in that Plaintiffs duly 
delivered notice to A.J. Dean of satisfaction of the lien on June 
8, 1993, but A.J. Dean refused to respond or release the lien at 
least until the date of its Default in this action which was 
December 5, 1994. 
10. By virtue of A.J. Dean's refusal to release the lien, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to $20.00 per day as a penalty from June 8, 
1993 through December 5, 1994, totalling $10,900.00. 
11. Plaintiffs have established a factual basis for their 
Fourteenth Claim for Relief, wrongful lien as against A.J. Dean in 
two regards: 
(a) Plaintiffs have established the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to an order quieting title to the property at issue 
in favor of Plaintiffs in that A.J. Dean's mechanics lien was 
wrongfully executed and recorded. 
-4-
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(b) Plaintiffs have established slander of title in that 
A.J. Dean's filing of a mechanic's lien was a written 
publication which was false, because the lien was wrongfully 
executed and recorded, and that A.J. Dean did publish or did 
refuse to retract such statement with actual malice. 
12. A.J. Dean's wrongful filing of an invalid lien did 
proximately cause damage to Plaintiffs in the amount of $9,458.00 
as the value of the lost opportunity to refinance their mortgage at 
a favorable interest rate. 
13. With regard to Plaintiffs' Fifteenth Claim for Relief, 
Punitive Damages, the Court finds that A.J. Dean's conduct relative 
to the above was willful and malicious and was taken with a 
disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are 
therefore entitled to^  an award of punitive damages in an amount 
sufficient to punish A.J. Dean and serve as a deterrent to others, 
which the Court determines to be b
 {&X^t S^> . 
14. The Court further orders that Plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorneys fees as discussed in the Conclusions of Law 
below. Plaintiffs have incurred attorneys fees as follows: 
(a) The Court finds that Plaintiffs incurred fees 
to Jarryl Rencher and the firm of Hanson, Epperson. & 
Smith in the amdtint of $18,200.00 between the 
commencement of representation and July of 1994, when a 
-5-
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conflict of interest first arose at the Hanson, Epperson 
& Smith law firm. This time is computed at $85.00 per 
hour, and the Court finds that the total fee and the 
hourly fee were reasonable and appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. 
(b) The Court finds that Plaintiffs have incurred 
fees to Reid W. Lambert and the firm of Woodbury & 
Kesler, P.C. in the amount of $5,115.00 from the 
commencement of its representation through the present. 
15. Based on the evidence at trial and the written memoranda 
filed by the parties, the Court now finds that of the total 
attorneys fees of $23,315.00 of attorneys fees incurred, 
arose from the claims for wrongful lien 
asserted against A.J. Dean, and may be recovered in this action. 
16. The Court expressly finds that there is no just reason . 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment as to A.J. Dean. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant A.J. Dean is in default by virtue of its 
failure to comply with the Court's Order compelling discovery, and 
default judgment shall therefore enter to the extent that 
Plaintiffs have established a prima facie basis for their claims 
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2. As set forth above, Plaintiffs have established prima 





Seventh Breach of Warranty-
Thirteenth Satisfaction of Lien 
Fourteenth Wrongful Lien 
Fifteenth Punitive Damages 
3. By virtue of the claims set forth above, Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a default judgment in the total amount of 
, broken down as follows: 
Amount Claim Item of damage 
Repair of driveway 
Repair of rain gutter 
Repair of lawn and landscaping 
Failure to release lien 
Loss of refinance opportunity 
TOTAL 
4. Plaintiffs are further entitled to default judgment for 
attorneys fees in the amount of > ~~Q — . . 
5. Plaintiffs are further entitled to punitive damages in 
the amount of f)~i OuOt 6d 
6. Pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court directs that default judgment be entered 
herein constituting the final judgment on all claims between 
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DATED this Pb -~d~ay of LrfX; (LShArfs}], 1996 
BY THE COURT: 
y \ 
Judge Anne M. 
Third District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GREEN & BERRY 
R. Scott Berry-
Attorney for A.J. Dean 
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